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**Crossing the Ocean by Feeling the Stones:
Relating Chinese Engagement in Africa to China's Development Experience**

Elizabeth C. Kennedy
Diplomacy and World Affairs
Occidental College
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Advised by Professor Lan Chu

1. Introduction

The People's Republic of China (PRC) has emerged as an incredibly influential actor in Africa during the past fifteen years. Although China has been active on the continent for over fifty years, the state's interaction in Africa took a business-focused and ideologically-divorced direction in the mid-1990s. This reorientation complemented the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) domestic policies aimed at transitioning to a market economy and opening up to the forces of globalization. Chinese leaders view Africa as a land of potential, actively courting political relationships and business ventures across the continent. The Chinese government regards Africa as critical to its national interests and consequently considers positive relations with African states a foreign policy priority.

The PRC uses its developmental success as a marketing tool to attract African leaders and promote increased Sino-African relations. As embodied in the China-Africa policy, the PRC asserts that Chinese engagement will support both African and Chinese development goals. By sharing the wisdom of Beijing's development strategies, Chinese officials proclaim that African countries can reach their development potential and integrate into the world economy. This political rhetoric is supported by tangible development assistance such as zero-tariff trade arrangements, debt-relief, investment, professional development and capacity-building measures.

While Chinese engagement does offer positive prospects for Africa's development, the effects of China's development strategies have not been wholly beneficial within China. China's thirty years of rapid development have led to serious structural problems within Chinese society. The CCP designed their development strategies with a singular focus on economic growth. These growth-above-all strategies have transformed the once egalitarian nation into a highly polarized and unequal society. China's development comes with high-costs such as labor exploitation, environmental degradation, unprecedented inequality, flagrant corruption and a loss of social welfare. Domestically, the Chinese government has been too slow to implement and enforce regulation addressing these concerns for fear that it will slow economic growth. This fear is partly derived from the developmental attitudes, often referred to as developmentalism, which permeate Chinese society. The pursuit of wealth has become a value that influences the actions of the

state, Chinese businesses and individuals. Thus, Chinese actors in Africa operate through the lens of their developmental attitudes and experiences. The PRC does not simply offer African states a development strategy. In many cases, Chinese engagement is an externalization of China's entire development experience.

Chinese engagement is further complicated by China's national interests. In particular, the acquisition of Africa's natural resources often determine Chinese engagement modalities. In order to continue on China's development trajectory, the country requires a substantial supply of natural resources. Although the PRC genuinely aspires to maintain a positive reputation abroad and to assist developing states in meeting their development goals, concerns about national interests often trump these desires. Just as the state has been too slow to implement and enforce regulation domestically, the state has been too slow to regulate its actors abroad for fear it will impede the fulfillment of their national interests.

This does not bode well for African development. African states cannot afford the externalities that have come with China's rapid development. Africa is already plagued by food insecurity, environmental degradation, societal instability, disease and corruption. However, many states cannot afford, nor do they desire, to end engagement with China. Chinese actors are providing unprecedented development opportunities throughout the continent. Therefore, African leaders throughout society must maintain an active role in shaping Chinese engagement.

With a full understanding of the impact of China's development strategies domestically, African leaders can design policies and strategies that support Sino-African cooperation while mitigating the developmental externalities which currently plague Chinese society. In this active role, African leaders can rebalance Sino-African relations and realize the win-win outcomes which the Chinese government espouses. This will help African states achieve a comprehensive level of development and integration into the world economy.

2. Understanding Chinese Engagement in Africa

Sino-African relations have grown considerably since the mid-1990s. Chinese politicians describe the relationship as a "constructive and strategic partnership of cooperation for mutual benefit and

common development.”¹ According to them, the relationship is based on the “principle of sincerity, friendliness, equality, mutual benefit, solidarity, cooperation and development.”² Officials state that as the largest developing country and the largest group of developing countries, China and Africa share common perspectives and interests, making them natural partners in the international community.³ Leaders emphasize the development potential of Africa, citing recent economic growth and increased stability. Du Xiacong of the Chinese Permanent Mission to the United Nations stated in 2010, “China is convinced that the potential of Africa will offer space for the future development of the whole world and China as well.”⁴

Chinese activities in Africa support the CCP’s political discourse. Foreign Ministers make the most high-level visits to Africa out of anywhere in the world.⁵ While in 2000, Sino-African trade volume was just US\$10 billion, in 2011, China-Africa trade volume reached US\$160 billion. This indicates a year-to-year average trade growth of thirty percent.⁶ With more than 2,000 Chinese enterprises in Africa, the continent receives considerable foreign direct investment (FDI). For instance, Chinese official FDI flows to Africa between 2007-2010 averaged \$1.5 billion per year.⁷ The PRC also supports numerous capacity building efforts and provides concessional loans for infrastructure projects. The Chinese government is deeply invested in Africa, ensuring a substantial and long-term relationship.

Chinese National Interests

¹ Du Xiacong, “China’s Role in Africa,” speech at Syracuse University Symposium on Africa-China Relations, April 28, 2010, accessed March 24, 2012, <http://www.focac.org/eng/zfgx/dfzc/t689653.htm>, 3.

² “China’s African Policy,” *The People’s Daily*, January 2006, accessed February 9, 2011, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200601/12/eng20060112_234894.html.

³ Jia Qinglin, “Full text of top Chinese political advisors speech at AU Summit.” Speech at AU Summit, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, January 29, 2012, accessed March 24, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-01/29/c_131381416.htm. 4.

⁴ Du Xiacong, “China’s Role in Africa.”

⁵ *Ibid*, 3.

⁶ *Ibid*, 4, and “China committed to helping build Africa’s self development capability: official,” *Xinhua*, January 27, 2012, accessed March 24, 2012, <http://www.focac.org/eng/zfgx/dfzc/t910982.htm>.

⁷ Deborah Brautigam, “China’s Growing Role in Africa,” *Testimony before the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Africa Affairs*, Washington D.C., November 1, 2011, accessed January 5, 2012, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Deborah_Brautigam_Testimony.pdf.

While Chinese leaders emphasize that their presence in Africa is based on mutual benefit and win-win development, China's engagement is also driven by national interests. Several reasons exist for China's rapid engagement in Africa. Natural resources, though not the sole reason for the Chinese presence in Africa, are a critical reason for China's activity throughout the continent. John Rocha, a Senior Project Manager for NEPAD Business Foundation, writes, "The fact is China needs Africa as much as Africa needs China. China needs raw materials from Africa and elsewhere to sustain its growing economy."⁸ Natural resources like oil, cobalt, lumber, diamonds, iron ore and copper are critical for China's short, medium and long-term growth. Currently, about thirty percent of Chinese oil is exported from Africa.⁹ Chinese demand is forecast to more than double to 14.2 million barrels per day by 2025, making positive relationships with oil-producing nations like Angola and Nigeria critical for Chinese development.¹⁰

China also cultivates relations with African states to garner support in multilateral forums. African support is seen as a means to establish a new international order void of Western domination.¹¹ Close relationships with African states serve to equalize power relations between the North and South in these forums. As the self-appointed leader of the developing world, this increases China's share of power internationally and advances their national interests.

Chinese politicians and business leaders recognize the economic opportunity Africa offers as well. Considering much of Africa's recent growth and increasing disposable income, the region is an attractive location for Chinese companies to export goods and gain international business experience. Although investment may initially be risky in some markets, Chinese officials and companies are willing to accept risk in exchange for long-term economic integration.

⁸ John Rocha, "China and African Natural resources: Developmental Opportunity or Deepening Resource Curse?" in *New Impulses from the South: China's Engagement in Africa*, Stellenbosch University, ed. Hannah Edinger, Hayley Herman, and Johanna Jansson (2008), http://www.ccs.org.za/downloads/CCS_-_New_Impulses_from_the_South_-_May_08.pdf.

⁹ Alex Vines, "China in Africa: A Mixed Blessing?" *Current History*, (2007): 214, http://www.relooney.info/0_Africa_49.pdf.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Joseph Y. S. Cheng, "China's Foreign Policy after the 17th party congress," in *Dancing with the Dragon: China's Emergence in the Developing World*, ed. Baogang Guo and Dennis Hickey (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2010): 35.

Lastly, the CCP engages African states to stymie official recognition of Taiwan.¹² The singular conditionality imposed on African governments is that they end diplomatic relations with Taiwan and recognize the One-China Principle. The principle asserts that the PRC is the rightful and singular Chinese government. With only 4 out of 54 African states maintaining formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan (Burkina Faso, Gambia, Sao Tome and Principe, and Swaziland), the PRC has been very successful.¹³

The above information highlights the complications associated with Chinese engagement in Africa. On one hand, China desperately desires to be viewed as a responsible leader of the developing world. Engagement is considered a means to support African development. This stimulates African political support of the PRC and increases the overall power of the developing world within the international community. On the other hand, engagement is a pragmatic means to obtain natural resources and integrate into foreign markets, both of which are critical for sustaining China's economy and continual development. While the Chinese government strives to make these interests complementary, in practice, they are sometimes contradictory.

Pertinent Policies

China's pragmatic approach to Africa was initially spurred by China's "Going Global" policy in 2001. The policy aims to move Chinese investment and enterprises overseas. The policy promotes Chinese firms to "invest overseas, establish factories and buy property."¹⁴ One goal of the policy is to promote brand recognition for China's most successful companies, coined "Dragon Heads."¹⁵ This includes Lenovo, Haier, and Huawei. The policy also hopes to improve the operations of other Chinese companies, forcing them to compete with foreign firms and gain international business acumen. The PRC supports overseas business activity through a number of means, including preferential loans, export

¹² David Shinn, "China's Growing Role in Africa: Implications for U.S. Policy," Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Africa Affairs, Washington, D.C., November 1, 2011, accessed January 5, 2012. http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/David_Shinn_Testimony.pdf.

¹³ "Political Status of Taiwan," *Wikipedia*, last updated March 23, 2012, accessed March 25, 2012, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_status_of_Taiwan.

¹⁴ Deborah, Brautigam, *The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 74.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

sellers credits and SEZs. The policy was especially significant in supporting initial business ventures in Africa.¹⁶

In addition to China's "Going Global" policy, the 2006 China-Africa policy is critical to understanding Chinese engagement. The policy describes Sino-African relations as a strategic partnership based on mutual benefit and common development. The policy emphasizes that as developing countries, China-Africa relations promote mutual interests. It advocates for enhanced cooperation in a wide array of areas such as foreign policy, trade, education, culture, health, science, technology and military endeavors. Throughout the policy, references to mutual experiences of exploitation provide a contrast between Chinese engagement and that of Western powers.¹⁷ The policy was published both to challenge claims of Chinese exploitation and to signal to African leaders a desire for increased cooperation.

China's policy of noninterference is also important for understanding Sino-African relations. This policy is derived from Beijing's "Five Principles of Peaceful Existence," which were established in 1955 at the famous Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung, Indonesia. The ideas produced at the conference became influential in the non-aligned movement and remain influential in Chinese foreign policy. The principals include: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual non-aggression; noninterference in the internal affairs of other states; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence.¹⁸ China's policy of noninterference is attractive in Africa, where the memory of colonialism and foreign exploitation remains deeply entrenched in the national fabric of many states. The policy of noninterference is central to China's foreign policy and greatly shapes the behavior of the Chinese State in Africa.

Modalities for Engagement

The multilateral mechanism for China-Africa relations is the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). Following in the legacy of the 1955 Bandung Conference, the forum is seen to promote a non-

¹⁶ Ibid, 74-5, 103-4, 112, and 298.

¹⁷ "China's Africa Policy," *The People's Daily*.

¹⁸ Denis Hickey and Baogang Guo, "Introduction," in *Dancing with the Dragon: China's Emergence in the Developing World*, . ed. Denis Hickey and Baogang Guo, (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2010): 4.

aligned and multilateral worldview.¹⁹ However, the emphasis at the forum is far more on practical engagement rather than political dialogue. The forum provides avenues for public and private leaders to build relationships through ministerial conferences, senior official meetings and entrepreneurs' conferences.²⁰ During the 2006 summit in Beijing, President Hu Jintao announced eight points to strengthen China-Africa partnership. These points included providing more aid, canceling debts, waiving duties, creating economic and trading cooperation districts, training professionals, building agricultural centers and building schools. Incredibly, before the next forum, all the measures listed by Hu were being implemented, a marked change from the many unfulfilled development promises of Western states. When looking at the agreements reached and fulfilled through the FOCAC, it is impossible to argue that the Chinese State is disinterested in African development.

The Chinese State uses a variety of mechanisms to finance Chinese engagement. According to Deborah Brautigam, an expert on Chinese development assistance in Africa, the instruments of PRC finance considered official development assistance include grants, zero-interest loans, debt-relief and concessional loans. Non-aid forms of financing include preferential export credits, market-rate export buyers credits and commercial loans from Chinese banks. China also maintains equity funds to support Chinese companies in Africa.²¹ Highlighting the influence of its own development experience, many of these financing arrangements were offered to China when it was a development assistance recipient.

Among influential government bodies, China Eximbank maintains a central role in facilitating Chinese engagement in Africa. Eximbank, the largest import-export bank in the world, promotes Chinese exports and investment, providing access to export credit, international guarantees and loans

¹⁹ He Wenping, "China's Perspective on Contemporary China-Africa Relations," in *China Returns to Africa*, ed. Chris Alden, Daniel Large and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008): 147.

²⁰ "China stays firmly committed to advancing ties with Africa, says vice FM," *Xinhua*, January 26, 2012, accessed March 24, 2012, <http://www.focac.org/eng/zfgx/dfzc/t911884.htm>.

²¹ Deborah Brautigam, "Chinese Development Aid in Africa: What, Where, Why and How Much?" *China Update 2011*, eds. Jane Golley and Ligang Song, (Canberra: Australia National University, 2011): 205.

for overseas investment.²² The bank also provides Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) a competitive advantage abroad. With Eximbank support, SOEs operate on slim profit margins and engage in projects considered too risky by other companies. Seventy-nine percent of Eximbank loans in Africa are given to Chinese SOEs for infrastructure projects.²³ Through the policy bank, the Chinese State influences the operations of SOEs abroad and promotes its national interests.

While the FOCAC is an important multilateral mechanism, the majority of Sino-African engagement occurs on a bilateral basis. Over the past decade, Chinese diplomats have developed a pattern for engaging African governments. Once an African government ends relations with Taiwan, representatives of both states hold a series of meetings to identify each party's interests and goals. These meetings result in a package deal reflecting the interests of both states. The deals include Chinese support in the form of debt cancellation, grants, loans and technology-transfer. Often, concessional loans are offered for the construction of infrastructure and political-prestige projects. For example, Chinese firms have built ports, roads, stadiums, hydropower plants and hospitals as a result of these deals. In exchange for this support, the African State typically provides China access to its extractive industries. The package deals include tied aid, requiring seventy percent of contracts to be awarded to Chinese firms and fifty percent of materials to originate from China.²⁴ These arrangements are similar to those China engaged in with Japan and other donors during the late 20th century. They are viewed by the Chinese State as a pragmatic means for each party to meet their development goals.

Considering the above information, it is understandable why many African leaders find Chinese engagement so attractive. Across Africa, leaders are hailing China's development model as the long-awaited answer to their development needs. While preparing for South Africa's recent State of the Nation address, Enoch Godongwana, head of the ANC's economic transformation committee, stated, "The

²² "China Eximbank," *International Rivers*, accessed August 9, 2011, <http://www.internationalrivers.org/node/3318> and, Todd Moss and Sarah Rose, "China Eximbank and Africa: New Lending, New Challenges," *Center for Global Development*, November 2006, <http://www.eldis.org/vfile/upload/1/document/0708/DOC22802.pdf>.

²³ Deborah Brautigam, *The Dragon's Gift*, 294.

²⁴ Lucy Corkin, "China's contribution to the development of African infrastructure through investment in the extractive industry," *Afrodad Occasional Papers* 8, December 2007, accessed April 7, 2012, <http://www.ccs.org.za/downloads/China%20Occasional%20Paper.pdf>.

Chinese model of building infrastructure and growing jobs will be a key focus of the ANC's economic policy."²⁵ Zimbabwean leader Robert Mugabe has implemented a "Look East" policy aimed at reorienting the country's foreign and economic policy towards the east, primarily China. In 2005, Mugabe stated, "It is very important for us...to develop the Look East Policy because that is where people who think like us are, same history of colonialism as ourselves, people who have started developing their economies."²⁶ In a now famous editorial to the *Financial Times*, Senegal's former President Abdoulaye Wade argued that the West has much to learn from China:

China's approach to our needs is simply better adapted than the slow and sometimes patronizing post-colonial approach of European investors, donor organizations and non-governmental organizations. In fact, the Chinese model for stimulating rapid economic development has much to teach Africa...the Chinese are more competitive, less bureaucratic and more adept at business in Africa.²⁷

The above quotes are just a small sample of statements by African leaders supporting Chinese activity in Africa. The Chinese approach, with its focus on economic cooperation, nonintervention and capacity building, resonates with many African leaders. The Chinese government has been very successful at marketing its development strategies in Africa.

3. Literature Review

A cacophony of scholarly voices abound regarding Chinese engagement in Africa. While a wealth of literature exists on this subject, scholars conclusions about Chinese engagement span the spectrum from criticism of China as Africa's new colonizer, to praises for providing Africa's development answer. It appears that location and academic background influence opinions on the Chinese presence in Africa. Discourse from Western scholars tends to carry a more critical tone, whereas scholars located in China often shed a positive light on engagement. African scholars are the most heterogeneous group, reflecting a general uncertainty among Africans about the impact of Chinese engagement.

²⁵ Matuma Letsoalo, Charles Molele, and Sharda Naidoo, "State of the Nation: Zuma adopts Chinese Model," February 3, 2012, accessed March 9, 2012, <http://mg.co.za/article/2012-02-03-zuma-adopts-chinese-model/>.

²⁶ Andrew Miller, "Zimbabwe: Zanu-PF and China - Does Zimbabwe Really 'Yearn for the Yuan,'" *All Africa*, March 5, 2012, accessed March 25, 2012, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201203051524.html>.

²⁷ Abdoulaye Wade, "Time for the West to Practice What it Preaches," *The Financial Times*, January 23, 2008, accessed June 23, 2011, <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5d347f88-c897-11dc-94a6-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz1TqcXdk5>.

Klare and Chan-Fishel, scholars focused on environmental issues, both identify problems with Chinese activities. Klare notes that the majority of Chinese engagement focuses on resource-rich states, regardless of the internal situation or ruling government. He points out that China regularly supplies arms and military training to states like Sudan, Nigeria and the DRC in exchange for resources. For Klare, destruction of the environment and support for infamous governments renders Chinese engagement in Africa dangerous.²⁸ Michelle Chan-Fishel, who focuses on environmental degradation in the mining, timber, oil and gas industries, asserts that, “The low-price development model actually comes at a very high cost - to societies, both inside and outside China, as well as the environment.”²⁹ Coming from an environmental standpoint, these scholars are highly critical of China’s activities in Africa.

Similarly critical, Eisenman and Kurlantzick highlight Chinese military cooperation, support for unsavory regimes, poor standards of corporate governance and unequal trade relationships, concluding that, “Chinese influence could complicate democratic consolidation and good governance...[China] could undermine years of international efforts to link aid to better governance.” The authors also emphasize the inequality Chinese engagement perpetuates but supporting some in society more than others.³⁰ Ali Askouri, a human rights advocate, is more critical, stating, “There is no doubt Chinese economic assistance is encouraging dictatorships and tyranny in Sudan, Chad, Zimbabwe and elsewhere.” For Askouri, Chinese leaders serve as accomplices to corrupt African leaders, leaving them implicit in human rights abuses.³¹ For those focused on human rights, Chinese engagement is conveyed as a threat to African and international actors promoting democratic values and good governance. However, these scholars often focus on Chinese relationships with more sensationalist African regimes’ and fail to recognize possible benefits of engagement in other states. While these scholars correctly identify detrimental consequences of Chinese engagement, they fail to recognize the connection between China’s

²⁸ Michael T. Klare, *Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet*, (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2008), 164-175.

²⁹ Michelle Chan-Fishel, “Environmental Impact, more of the same?” in *African Perspectives on China in Africa*, Firoze Manji and Stephen Marks, (Dar es Salaam: Fahamu, 2007).

³⁰ Joshua Eisenman and Joshua Kurlantzick, “China’s Africa Strategy,” *Current History*, May 2006, accessed June 10, 2011, 223, <http://www.somalilandpatriots.com/print-1864-0>.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ali Askouri, “China’s Investment in Sudan: displacing villages and destroying communities,” Firoze Manji and Stephen Marks, (Dar es Salaam: Fahamu, 2007).

development process and African engagement. They also take too extreme of positions, focusing on the negative aspects of Chinese engagement with little recognition of how China's activities can benefit African development.

Conversely, many Chinese scholars cast a positive light upon engagement. They focus on perceived economic benefits, developing-nation partnership (often referred to as South-South cooperation) and the lack of colonial history between China and Africa. Jing Men highlights the benefits of Chinese trade, debt relief and unconditional economic aid. He emphasizes that many conditional measures tied to Western development assistance strangled African development and perpetuated asymmetric donor-recipient relationships. For Men, China offers Africa an attractive partnership of equals, provides economic opportunities and increases African political leverage internationally.³² Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong, based in Hong Kong, are also positive. They highlight the numerous benefits of Chinese engagement: cheap goods for consumers, trade, investment and infrastructure. For the authors, the central benefit of Chinese engagement is its nature. They argue that while the West maintains asymmetric relationships reminiscent of colonialism, Chinese leaders offer Africans a relationship based on equality and partnership.³³

He Wenping, the director of the Africa Studies program at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), also highlights the positive nature of the Sino-African relationship. She claims the Sino-African relationship is "based more on the principles of sustainability and mutual benefit, rather than charity, [Chinese] aid projects are both stable and inherently equal, whereby China's aid to Africa is not one of "superior" providing for an "inferior" but rather one developing nation assisting another."³⁴ While briefly noting some of the problems in the relationship, He Wenping concludes that overall, China is "helping Africa help itself."³⁵ These positive scholars focus on the benefits, particularly economic, of Sino-African relations. However, they too fail to showcase other aspects of Chinese engagement and the

³² Jing Men, "China and Africa: Old Friends, New Partners," in *Dancing with the Dragon: China's Emergence in the Developing World*, Baogong Guo and Denis Hickey, ed. (Lanham: Lexington Books: 2010).

³³ Yan Hairong and Barry Sautman, "Friends and Interests: China's Distinctive Links with Africa," *African Studies Review* 50.3 (2007).

³⁴ He Wenping, "The Balancing Act of China's Africa Policy," *China Security* 3.3 (2007).

³⁵ Ibid.

domestic connection to outward Chinese activity. Clearly, a vast difference exists in scholars' evaluations of Sino-African relations. Each conveniently highlights the benefits or detriments, either wholly ignoring or only briefly recognizing detractors from their arguments.

Serge Michel and Michel Beuret, French scholars, maintain a more balanced analysis, claiming that, "China has met Africa's needs head on and at last established a sound basis for development." They highlight the benefits of China's infrastructure projects, as well as the positive impact China has had on Africa's image. They conclude that ultimately the impact of Chinese engagement depends on African leaders.³⁶ For African scholar Garth Le Pere, the quality and capability of African leaders will determine the impact of Chinese engagement. He contends that the West's criticism of China is superfluous, stating, "The phobia over which Chinese engagement in Africa is perceived as a threat is largely a product of Western-inspired hypocrisy and arrogance."³⁷ Pere asserts that while there are areas for concern, clear benefits exist. He points out that Chinese engagement is not static, but dynamic and improving with experience. Pere argues that African leaders must craft a China policy just as China has crafted an Africa policy.³⁸ These scholars, while still failing to relate engagement to China's domestic experiences, paint a more accurate picture of relations. Importantly, they focus on the role African leaders must take in ensuring development.

Deborah Brautigam, one of the foremost experts on Chinese development assistance, also highlights the dynamism of Chinese engagement. She explains that Sino-African activities are based on China's its own development experience as a recipient of assistance. For her, these experiences are very influential in shaping China's behavior and policies as a donor.³⁹ Wenran Jiang, is more explicit than Brautigam in his assertion that China is exporting its development experience to Africa. For Jiang, China's behavior is shaped by its experience as a recipient of assistance and the CCP's own

³⁶ Michel Beuret and Serge Michel, "Conclusion," in *China Safari*, (New York: Nation Books: 2009)

³⁷ Garth le Pere, "Prospect for a Coherent African Policy Response: Engaging China," in *n New Impulses from the South: China's Engagement in Africa*, Stellenbosch University, ed. Hannah Edinger, Hayley Herman, and Johanna Jansson, May 2008, http://www.ccs.org.za/downloads/CCS_-_New_Impulses_from_the_South_-_May_08.pdf, 13.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Deborah Brautigam, "Emerging China," in *The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

developmental policies. He often takes a critical tone, highlighting the losses within Chinese society in exchange for economic growth. Like Le Pere, Michel and Beuret, Jiang argues that African leaders must understand China's domestic situation and make measured decisions regarding Chinese assistance.⁴⁰ Brautigam and Jiang provide a comprehensive understanding of Chinese engagement, highlighting its historical influences, dynamic nature and relation to domestic realities in China. They are two underrepresented voices in China-Africa literature, forming a small minority that recognizes the close connection between the PRC's outward and inward policies.

While Brautigam and Jiang serve as central influences in this research, they too fail to identify the influence of developmentalism in Sino-African engagement. Developmentalism, as defined by scholar Lin Chun, is the single-minded and reckless pursuit of growth.⁴¹ Chun, who does not study Sino-African relations, but rather serves as a development scholar, recounts the changes in the Chinese psyche due to thirty years of rapid development. The Chinese population now carries with them developmental attitudes focused on growth-at-all-costs. Chun describes how this developmentalism severely harms Chinese society and threatens future development.

Following along Brautigam and Jiang's underrepresented arguments, this research will highlight the connection between China's development experience and outward activities. It will also attempt to relate Chun's theories of Chinese developmentalism to Chinese engagement in Africa. By highlighting the relation between China's domestic situation and its operations in Africa, this research seeks to provide further insight on the dynamic and complex nature of Chinese engagement in Africa.

4. Methods

Case Selection

The cases for this research were chosen because Zambia and Sudan are among China's top trade partners in Sub-Saharan Africa. This research had two main goals. The foremost goal was to understand the relation between China's developmental experience and the behavior of Chinese actors in Africa. The underlying goal was to gain a dynamic understanding of Chinese engagement and how it affects African

⁴⁰ Wenran Jiang, "Fueling the Dragon: China's Rise and Its Energy and Resources Extraction in Africa," *The China Quarterly* 199 (2009): 585-609.

⁴¹ Lin Chun, "Recasting Development in China," *Development* 50.3 (2007), 11.

development. In order to reach these goals, I utilized diverse case studies. These studies represent the variance in Chinese engagement, highlighting differing host country contexts and the impact of national interests on engagement. The Zambian case is representative of a democratic country with a variety of political actors and active civil society participation. The Sudanese case is representative of an authoritarian government with a suppressed civil society. My choice of case studies was also pragmatic. I had to find cases that fit within my chosen period of 1995 to 2010 and that had a variety of primary and secondary sources.

Approach and Research

This research is structured by a general research question which seeks to understand how China's domestic developmental experience influences engagement in Africa, and, consequently, how this engagement impacts African development. To answer this question, I took an issue-based, comparative approach. Using my contextual analysis, I identified primary externalities in China's rapid development: labor exploitation, environmental degradation, corruption and inequality. Through the lens of these issues, I identified and analyzed the cases. Within each case, I sought to discover whether engagement supported common development and how engagement related to China's domestic development. To complete this task, I engaged the methods of archival research, discourse analysis and process tracing.

While most of my sources were secondary sources from scholarly journals, I attempted to collect literature from a wide-spectrum of scholars with differing academic emphases and physical locations. My research on Zambia was primarily based on the fieldwork of previous scholars, with supplementary news articles and other documents. For the Sudanese case, I employed a wide variety of literature, including news articles, scientific articles and social science articles.

5. Contextual Analysis

The PRC's Experience as An Aid Recipient

China's development assistance modalities across Africa and the rest of the developing world are greatly influenced by their own experience as an aid recipient. In the 1970s, China appeared like many African states today. Its economy was primarily agrarian and the Chinese landscape was well-endowed

with natural resources.⁴² Japan, similar to China today, was a rapidly developing state in need of natural resources to support its growth. Recognizing the complementarity within their economies, Japan and China engaged in a strategic donor-recipient relationship. Between 1973 and 1978, “Chinese officials signed seventy-four contracts with Japan to finance turn-key projects that would form the backbone of China’s modernization. All would be repaid in oil.”⁴³ The engagement embodied a pattern now reflected in Chinese activities with African states: investment-for-resource swaps and compensatory trade.⁴⁴ The former consisted of Japan offering China resource-backed concessional loans, largely for the construction of infrastructure projects such as mines and telecommunications systems. Over time, China paid the loans with the resources extracted via the newly constructed infrastructure. The later, compensatory trade, allowed Chinese companies to import needed equipment and machinery from Japanese companies, which they would pay back overtime with products produced on the equipment.

As Brautigam emphasizes, both China and Japan saw this relationship as beneficial to their national interests. Through Japanese assistance, China gained access to its natural resources, as well as infrastructure, technology, skills and equipment. This was perceived as a necessary step to modernize the country and boost their own production capacity. As time wore on, Western countries began to compete with Japan, providing China further basis for modernization through tied-aid projects.⁴⁵ As a recipient, China used foreign assistance to strategically support its development. The Chinese State therefore frames its assistance with Africa through the historical lens of its own development support. The premise of mutual benefit still exists, but today China now fulfills the role of industrialized Japan and African states that of developmental China.

It doesn’t Matter Whether it’s a Black Cat or White Cat, as Long as it Catches the Mouse

The above quote, spoken by Deng Xiaoping, often called the father of contemporary China, referred to his emphasis on improving the Chinese economy regardless of ideology. Between the early developmental period discussed above and the current period, China experienced unprecedented

⁴² Deborah Brautigam, “The Dragon’s Gift,” 46.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid, 47.

⁴⁵ Ibid, 48.

economic development. During this time, the Chinese economy gradually transformed from a highly-regulated communist economy to a market-driven economy. Today, China's approach to development is termed the "Beijing Consensus." Originally coined by Joshua Cooper Ramo in 2004, the term can be summarized by five central components:

1. Incremental Reform: This refers to China's gradual approach to economic reform. Rather than instituting grand economic reforms over the whole country, they often tested policies first at the provincial level, experimenting with reforms until finding those that produced the best economic results
2. Innovation and Experimentation: China's economy is driven by constant innovation and experimentation, which promotes productivity and the competitiveness of Chinese firms
3. Export-Led Growth: China has become the "workshop of the world," with its economic growth driven by the high-demand for exports to the rest of the world
4. State Capitalism: This highly ambiguous term basically means that while the prices of most goods in the Chinese economy are market-driven, many companies remain state-owned enterprises (SOEs), providing them advantages within the economy
5. Authoritarianism: The Chinese government maintains highly concentrated and centralized power, easing the implementation of policies and suppressing dissent.⁴⁶

Together, these form the "five central pillars" that drove China's economic development. With the state facilitating constant innovation through technological, industrial and infrastructural investment, the Chinese economy liberalized and experienced rapid economic development.

China underwent both positive and negative transformational changes due to its rapid development. The positive changes are well-known. From 1981 to 2005, poverty was reduced from 84 percent to just 16 percent of the population, or a decline of 627 million people in real numbers.⁴⁷ Over the past 30 years, GDP averaged an annual rate of 9.7 percent, reaching rates as high as 14 percent during the last decade.⁴⁸ China attracts massive amounts of foreign direct investment, propelling its industries, technological innovation and productive forces. While the living standards of many Chinese citizens are still far from those of Norway or the United States, they are converging at a rapid rate. This provides increasing numbers of Chinese people the ability to clothe and feed themselves, and for some, the ability to purchase luxury goods.

While a great number of benefits have resulted from China's rapid economic development, a wealth of less-publicized problems currently plague Chinese society. Lin Chun states that

⁴⁶ John Williamson, "Is the Beijing Consensus now Dominant?" *Asia Policy* 13 (2012), 6-7.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

developmentalism has been a longstanding problem in China, leading to “a retreat of public welfare provision for social security in the name of economic rationality and efficiency.”⁴⁹ Wenran Jiang characterizes China’s modernization as:

Heavy industrialization, labour- and capital-intensive manufacturing industries, export-led growth, low labour cost and high environmental damage. By following such a development paradigm, China’s “miracle” growth of GDP has come with heavy price tags on wages, workers’ welfare, the eco-system and political reforms.⁵⁰

China’s rapid economic growth comes at a high-cost to the livelihoods of Chinese citizens. The current Chinese development model decreases the quality of life for many Chinese citizens and threatens future development prospects.

Chun remarks that China’s development path has led to “naked greed, ruthless competition, hysterical consumerism and the commodification of human values.” Although China’s industrialization improved the living standards of millions of Chinese citizens, winners and losers have emerged in the process. Observers are quick to note that China’s modernization vastly favors those in urban areas over rural, leaving rural residents with much of the environmental degradation and corruption and little of the economic benefit. While an increase in inequality during times of industrialization is common, the sharp variance among Chinese citizens is cause for concern. Official figures show urban Chinese earning on average 23 times more than their rural counterparts, a number that many believe is underreported.⁵¹ Li Shi, an expert on income distribution trends at Beijing Normal University, states that China’s GINI coefficient (which depicts income inequality with 0 equalling perfect equality and 1 representing perfect inequality) has deteriorated from 0.3 a quarter century ago to close to 0.5 today.⁵² This rapid increase in inequality does not bode well for the CCP domestically, driving up citizen grievances towards the government and threatening domestic stability.

The environmental degradation caused by China’s rapid industrialization is also cause for serious concern. In 2007, China claimed 16 of the world’s 20 most polluted cities. Due to massive deforestation

⁴⁹ Lin Chun, “Recasting Development in China,” 11-12.

⁵⁰ Wenran Jiang, “Fueling the Dragon,” 587.

⁵¹ Dexter Roberts, “China’s Growing Income Gap,” *Bloomberg Business Week*, January 27, 2011, accessed March 9, 2012, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/11_06/b4214013648109.htm.

⁵² Ibid.

and land degradation, a quarter of the country is now desert. It is reported that 90 percent of the aquifers in Chinese cities are polluted, threatening the health of countless Chinese citizens and leaving 700 million people with drinking water contaminated by animal and human waste.⁵³ When the environmental impact of China's modernization is accounted for, its astonishing economic growth looks anemic. Studies estimate that, "environmental degradation and pollution costs the Chinese economy between 8 percent and 12 percent GDP annually."⁵⁴ This environmental degradation threatens the health of the Chinese people and future economic prosperity. Considering that China's modernization has been due to the exploitation of its natural environment, the future of Chinese development is extremely uncertain.

Moreover, the developmental attitudes in China have resulted in unrestrained business practices. Operating in the competitive and profit-driven domestic market, Chinese enterprises have little experience with corporate social responsibility or adherence to labor and environmental standards. The competitive domestic environment encourages corrupt behavior by Chinese firms. Even when officials in Beijing enact environmental laws, factory owners and local officials fail to enforce them. Elizabeth Economy, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, has found that many factory owners prefer to pay the fines for pollution rather than make the costly upgrades required for environmentally-friendly infrastructure. For example, in a 2005 survey of 509 cities, only 23 percent of factories reported properly treating sewage.⁵⁵ Most worrisome of all, the Chinese business community believes that environmental protection seriously decreases their profitability. A poll of Chinese companies found that only 18 percent thought they could excel economically while operating in an environmentally friendly manner.⁵⁶ Developmentalism has seeped into Chinese business practices, threatening the well-being of China's environment for improved productivity and greater profits.

This competitive culture not only threatens the well-being of the environment, but also the well-being of the worker. China's lack of stringent labor standards and employers disregard for existing

⁵³ Elizabeth C. Economy, "The Great Leap Backward?" *Foreign Affairs* 86.5 (2007), accessed March 9, 2012, 38-59, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62827/elizabeth-c-economy/the-great-leap-backward>.

⁵⁴ *Ibid*, 44.

⁵⁵ *Ibid*, 42.

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, 48.

standards have led to countless health problems, injuries, and work-related deaths. By 2007, the cumulative number of confirmed pneumoconiosis cases, an occupational lung disease, was nearly 630,000.⁵⁷ A study reported that work related fatalities in China involved 7,046 worker fatalities during the 2-year period of 2001 to 2003. The most fatal events included collisions (25.6%), drownings (14.6%), and structural collapses (12.5%).⁵⁸ Workers are consistently exposed to occupational hazards and exploitative labor practices.

The negative affects of China's development strategies are of concern to the central Chinese government. In the past ten years, the central government has gradually enacted a variety of laws and regulations aimed at improving the domestic situation. However, a gap exists in regulation and enforcement. According to Lin Chun, "China suffers from institutional weaknesses in its legal and regulatory infrastructure."⁵⁹ The massive state bureaucracy often lends itself to miscommunication, lack of coordination and general confusion, thus debilitating it from enforcing regulation. Additionally, a schism exists between the central government and provincial or local governments. Officials at lower levels of governance are more likely to ignore central regulatory laws due to personal interests in public and private companies, preexisting provincial laws and a desire to support competitive companies within their region. Thomas Thompson of Foreign Affairs notes, "Many companies even invite local officials to become silent partners in their corporations in return for political protection."⁶⁰ Compounding enforcement problems further, the CCP's distaste for public criticism, establishes an environment that alienates investigative journalists, civil society actors and whistleblowers. In other societies, these actors play a critical role in supporting regulatory enforcement. In China, they are censured. While the central government is increasingly aware of and concerned with the negative affects of China's rapid development, enforcement of regulation remains lax. This perpetuates the societal problems caused by China's rapid growth and development.

⁵⁷ Sian Griffiths, Qingkun Song, Lap-Ah Tse, Xiaorong Wang, Siying Wu, Tze-Wai Wong, Ignatius T. S. Yu, "Occupational Health and Safety Challenges in China-Focusing on Township Village Enterprises," *Archives of Environmental and Occupational Health* 66.1, 2001, accessed April 1, 2012, 5. EBSCO.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁵⁹ Lin Chun, "Recasting Development in China," 13.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

The domestic environment in China breeds a culture devoted to profit and efficiency above all else. Chinese development policies have supported economic development, but also fostered widespread developmentalism. This should be a serious concern for African leaders interested in replicating the Chinese development model. On a continent seriously threatened by environmental degradation and known for domestic instability and strife, exportation of the Chinese development model could have grave consequences on the well-being of Africans. China's weak legal system, lack of regulation, culture of opacity and high-level of corruption leaves Chinese enterprises negligent concerning occupational standards, environmental protection and responsible corporate conduct.⁶¹ If Chinese enterprises operate in this manner domestically, there is little reason why their behavior would change in Africa unless pressure for change came from within the African State. Therefore, African leaders must be mindful to look beyond the CCP's win-win rhetoric and maintain an active role in ensuring Chinese engagement benefits African societies.

6. Case Studies

Chinese Labor Relations in Zambia's Chambishi Copperbelt

The trials and tribulations of China's mining industry are infamous domestically. While the central government has implemented mining regulations, Chinese mining firms are notorious for ignoring such regulation and maintaining deplorable labor standards. This has resulted in an average of seven mining deaths per day in China.⁶² While many examples of China's mining tribulations exist, an accident in 2009 caught worldwide attention due to its severity. Under the management of the state-owned enterprise Heilongjiang Longmei Mining Holding Group, Chinese miners were extracting coal one April day from the Xinxing mine in Northern China. Despite knowing for over an hour that gas levels in the mine shaft were five times the level required for evacuation, the SOE's managers failed to evacuate their employees. This resulted in the unnecessary deaths of 104 Chinese miners.⁶³ The managers' conduct highlights their prioritization of productivity and profit over the well-being of their employees. Accidents

⁶¹ Wenran Jiang, "Fueling the Dragon," 590.

⁶² LaFraniere, Sharon, "With Hope dwindling, 115 China Miners are Saved," *The New York Times*, April 5, 2010, accessed March 15, 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/06/world/asia/06mine.html>.

⁶³ Maxim Duncan, "China Families Protest Mine disaster; toll hits 104," *Reuters*, November 23, 2009, accessed April 8, 2012, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/11/23/us-china-mine-explosion-idUSTRE5AK08Y20091123>.

such as this are a common occurrence in China, leaving Chinese citizens concerned about the well-being of their compatriots in the mining industry.

Many of the problems concerning China's domestic mining industry have also been replicated in Zambian mining operations. Contemporary Zambia reflects characteristics similar to the Chinese State forty years ago. While the country has a wealth of natural resources including copper, zinc and cobalt, it lacks the investment, human capital, technology and infrastructure to fully access these resources.⁶⁴ Zambia is deficient in basic infrastructure such as roads, railways and electric power facilities. Muna Ndulo, an African scholar, notes that many Zambians lack the entrepreneurial experience, education and technical skills required to utilize their natural resources and mobilize the economy.⁶⁵ Fully recognizing Zambia's wealth of minerals and development potential, the Chinese State provides considerable development assistance to Zambia. Their partnership reflects China's pragmatic and business focused approach to relations abroad. Chinese investments have financed the construction of copper smelters, powers stations, factories and hospitals.⁶⁶ Additionally, Zambia houses two Special Economic Zones similar to those located in China. In exchange for these investments, China maintains a steady supply of Zambia's copper and other resources while also maintaining a strong presence in the country's domestic markets. The arrangements between the two countries bear a strong similarity to China's arrangements with Japan decades earlier. Each state offers the other opportunities necessary to their development.

The deals reached by PRC officials and their Zambian counterparts often include infrastructure and construction projects. Under the requirements of Eximbank, Chinese SOEs are rewarded the contracts for such projects. China Non-Ferrous Africa Mining, PLC (NFC-Africa) receives many Zambian contracts related to the mining industry.⁶⁷ In 1998, NFC-Africa began operating in Zambia's Chambishi Copperbelt with assistance from China's Eximbank. Their first major investment included the

⁶⁴ Muna Ndulo, "Chinese Investments in Africa: A case study of Zambia," in *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon*, 140-141.

⁶⁵ Muna Ndulo, "Chinese Investments in Africa," 141.

⁶⁶ *Ibid*, 142.

⁶⁷ *Ibid*.

resuscitation of a copper mine that had been closed for over ten years.⁶⁸ The firm bought an 85 percent stake in the mine for US\$20 million, investing an additional US\$130 million to modernize infrastructure and begin operations.⁶⁹ Initially, Zambians were hopeful about the prospects of these new investors. Chinese investment supported employment, increased tax revenue for the government and provided an overall boost to the struggling economy.

Despite initial enthusiasm, a number of grievances accrued between the Zambian workers and their Chinese managers. One source of conflict concerned hiring practices. Reminiscent of domestic hiring practices, NFC-Africa hired the highest proportion of casual workers (also known as informal or non-contract workers) of all the foreign firms operating in the Copperbelt. Out of the 2,063 employees hired by NFC, only 56 had permanent contracts.⁷⁰ These casual workers did not receive work-related benefits or the job security of a permanent contract. Further frustrating the Chambishi community, the company subcontracted out parts of its operations. This provided little opportunity for the skill transfer opportunities boasted about by Chinese and Zambian politicians. Moreover, Zambian workers repeatedly complained about labor conditions at NFC-Africa, which they considered unsafe and exploitative. NFC-Africa's business conduct in Zambia demonstrated a similarity to the practices of domestic Chinese mining firms. Whereas domestically workers have been conditioned to accept these standards as the costs of development, unconditioned Zambian workers found Chinese business conduct unacceptable.

Recently, Human Rights Watch (HRW) published a report concerning NFC's operations. While recognizing the investment and job creation the firm spurs, HRW concluded that NFC's employees "suffer abusive employment conditions that fail to meet domestic and international standards."⁷¹ Through interviews, the report found that miners endured poor ventilation, excessive working hours, lack of potable water, lack of protective equipment and threat of being fired for refusing to work in unsafe

⁶⁸ Deborah Brautigam, *The Dragon's Gift*, 5.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ching Kwan Lee, "Raw Encounters: Chinese Managers, African Workers, and the politics of Casualization in Africa's Chinese Enclaves," *The China Quarterly* 199 (2009), 651. Proquest.

⁷¹ *You'll Be Fired if You Refuse: Labor Issues in Zambia's State-owned Copper Mines*, Human Rights Watch, November 2011, accessed March 31, 2012, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/zambia1111ForWebUpload.pdf>, 1.

environments.⁷² The report identified managers' developmental attitudes and disregard for regulation, stating that managers found regulations to be "more of an imposition than an important component of a well-run copper mining operation."⁷³ Recognizing the connection to China's domestic business conduct, Human Rights Watch concluded, "Some issues in Zambia [are] strikingly similar to safety and labor problems that plague China's domestic mining industry."⁷⁴

ULCA professor Ching Kwan Lee conducted fieldwork on Chinese-Zambian labor relations. In Ching Kwan Lee's interviews with managers, the scholar found that the managers' business modalities were based on their domestic experiences transitioning from a state-run to market economy. She states,

For the Chinese managers, adopting a casual employment system was a natural response to the political and economic circumstances in both China and Africa. China's own state-owned enterprise reform had smashed the "iron rice bowl" and stripped enterprises of all welfare functions...Chinese managers [are] convinced by reform at home that China *and they* know the way to break out of poverty and underdevelopment.⁷⁵

Lee recognized "a gap between what managers call work ethics and workers call exploitation."⁷⁶

Managers recall the hard work and sacrifices made during the Chinese development process. They justify high demands on workers and strenuous work conditions as a necessary condition for the firm's success and Zambia's development. This directly conflicts with Zambia's post-independence experience. During this period, high labor standards were established to protect Zambians from foreign exploitation.⁷⁷ For Zambians, the conditions Chinese managers imposed upon them did not equate with development, they equated with exploitation.

The frustrations surrounding work conditions were compounded by workers' knowledge of growing copper prices. From 2001 to 2006, prices rose from \$1,400 a ton to about \$7,000 a ton.⁷⁸ As workers failed to see their incomes rise, they watched Chinese employees live comfortably, "Whereas

⁷² Ibid, 2.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ching Kwan Lee, "Raw Encounters," 652-653.

⁷⁶ Ibid, 654.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid, 659.

around a thousand Chinese workers lived in comfortable, well supplied camps, the locals has to make do with corrugated-iron shacks.”⁷⁹ This gap in living standards further angered NFC’s employees.

Due to the proliferating list of grievances, Zambia’s powerful unions forced NFC-Africa into negotiations in 2004.⁸⁰ Union leaders advocated for improved contractual terms, increased wages and adherence to occupational safety standards. Throughout the negotiation process, union leaders felt as if the Chinese management was stalling to come to a compromise. “I’ve never seen such difficult negotiations,” said Agnes Bwalya, a union leader and member of the Chambishi City Council, “The Chinese like to keep changing the make-up of the delegation. It’s a stalling tactic...and if they start to feel put upon, then they just lay off a load of people and turn to non-unionized temporary workers”⁸¹ Just as domestic managers thwart regulations and avoid improvements in operations, managers in Zambia attempted to circumvent union demands.

The attitude of Zambia’s central government emboldened Chinese managers to remain unresponsive to local demands. French scholars Serge Michel and Michel Beuret noted during the negotiations, “The Zambian government, like its police force, has given its full support to the Chinese and their business interests.” After one set of protests against the Chinese, then President Levy Mwanawasa chided his people, stating,

You people of Chambishi should know better. This mine here was run by a South African company which failed. The Chinese came and you have seen what is happening. Don’t be cheated to lose your employment, because your children will suffer.⁸²

With such high-level government support, Chinese managers initially felt their long-term business interests in Zambia were secure regardless of employee satisfaction.

Frustrated by the protracted state of negotiations and lack of government support, conflict between NFC-Africa and the surrounding Zambian community reached new heights in the April of 2005. Failing to follow safety regulations, NFC’s BGRIMM explosives plant exploded, killing fifty-two Zambian

⁷⁹ Michel Beuret and Serge Michel, 239.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Deborah Brautigam, “The Dragon’s Gift,” 6-7.

employees.⁸³ The lack of occupational safety standards at BGRIMM was well-known before the explosion. An account of the conditions by Serge Michel and Michel Beuret depict the difficult and dangerous working conditions previous to the explosion:

The workforce was selected, if that is the word, from a crowd that would gather outside the plant's gates each morning. None of the chosen few had any training in handling dangerous materials and fifty of them were crammed into a workshop designed to accommodate fewer than one-third that number. The workers were not made to surrender their cigarettes, lighters, or cell phones on their way in, and most important, there were no separate areas for those making dynamite and those making detonators.⁸⁴

Quickly becoming the largest mining accident in Zambia's recent history, the story of the explosion spread throughout Zambia. Nationalist arguments to expel China from Zambia seeped into the country's political discourse, with presidential candidate Micheal Sata calling for Zambians to reclaim their country from foreign "infesters."⁸⁵ While President Mwanawasa continued to support Chinese activities, large sectors of Zambian society turned critical of both NFC and the Chinese State. Although Sata lost the election in 2006, his anti-Chinese position helped him gain considerable support with working-class Zambians and those sympathetic to their struggles. The explosion at BGRIMM served as a formative event in Sino-Zambian relations, bringing anti-Chinese sentiment into mainstream Zambian society.

Within this toxic climate, workers went on strike in the April of 2006. Furious with their labor conditions and low wages, they gathered by the front gate of NFC one morning, calling for increased pay and improved standards.⁸⁶ Throughout the day, employees, family members and community members gathered in protest. The crowd grew increasingly angry, eventually exploding into violence:

Workers burned the trucks loaded with copper, trashing paper documents in the offices, and even attacked the China house on the edge of Chambishi township. The Zambian police used rubber bullets and one miner was shot in the leg. Workers also blocked the main road to Chingola and set logs on fire to prevent passage.⁸⁷

⁸³ Ching Kwan Lee, "Raw Encounters," 664.

⁸⁴ Michel Beuret and Serge Michel, *China Safari*, 237.

⁸⁵ Deborah Brautigam, "Michael Sata and China in Zambia," *The Real Story of China in Africa*. Blog. October 3, 2011, accessed March 31, 2011. <http://www.chinaafricarealstory.com/2011/10/michael-sata-and-china-in-zambia.html>.

⁸⁶ Ching Kwan Lee, "Raw Encounters," 664.

⁸⁷ *Ibid*, 661.

The violent strike, paired with increasing anti-Chinese sentiment throughout Zambia, caused NFC to realize their precarious position. Fearing their business prospects threatened, the Chinese managers finally produced concessions. In 2007, NFC raised wages by 23 percent, casual or short-term jobs were converted to permanent positions and employee benefits increased.⁸⁸ Looking back on the protest, a union leader involved in the collective bargaining agreement stated, “It was this strike that has put fear among the Chinese...It was illegal but it was necessary because it was the quickest way to achieve our goal.”⁸⁹

CCP action following the protests suggests that anti-Chinese sentiment caused Chinese officials great concern. Recognizing that the sentiments could damage China’s reputation and future acquisition of Zambian minerals, the Chinese State issued a number of guidelines aimed at improving the conduct of Chinese firms abroad. In August 2006, just months after the Zambian protest, China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) issued recommendations aimed at improving the safety of workers in overseas investments. The guidelines suggested Chinese firms hire more locals, respect local customs and respect international standards.⁹⁰ The same year, the Chinese State Council, one of the most powerful government organs in the PRC, published nine directives to improve corporate social responsibility abroad.⁹¹ Continuing this trend, in 2007 MOFCOM requested that the Organization for Economic Cooperation (OECD) explain their *Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises* to Chinese companies. The guidelines outline proper conduct for enterprises abroad and suggest means to improve corporate social responsibility programs.⁹² These guidelines imply that the Chinese State was concerned with the consequences of improper SOE conduct abroad.

The relationship between PRC officials and NFC-Africa is complex and opaque. The enterprise acts as market-driven and profit seeking venture. However, as an SOE, it often relies on the State to help finance operations abroad and obtain contracts. One can therefore surmise that PRC officials had

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Ibid, 660.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Peter Bosshard, Kristen McDonald, and Nichole Brewer, “Exporting Dams: China’s Hydropower Industry Goes Global,” *Journal of Environmental Management* (2007), Accessed April 2, 2012. http://rivers.bee.oregonstate.edu/china_dam_study/JEM%20articles/mcdonald_et_al_2008.pdf, 9.

considerable influence over NFC's change in behavior. Following MOFCOM's recommendations and the State Council's directives, NFC-Africa established a corporate social responsibility program in Chambishi. The program entailed renovations of a local hospital, road repairs, construction of public recreation facilities and donations to Zambian education and women's empowerment programs.⁹³ NFC's collective agreement and corporate social responsibility programs, following the State's guidelines and directives, suggests that the Chinese State influenced NFC to improve its conduct in Zambia.

Relations between NFC-Africa and the Chambishi community have steadily improved, though labor disputes continue. Illustrating the complexity of the situation in Zambia, Zambian employees convey mixed feelings when speaking of their managers:

The thing I like about the Chinese is that if a Chinese is not designated as a boss, they will bring him down to work with us and they will not discriminate in his favor because he is a Chinese. He will do the same job as everyone else.⁹⁴

There was massive unemployment in Chambishi...But with the coming of the Chinese you find that almost everybody, as long as he can work, is now employed in the Chinese mines. So we are happy...the Chinese are able to give us at least an income to feed and keep our children. Before the Chinese came people would just be loitering on the streets while some would go into the plant to steal things like cables and scrap metals but those are things of the past. So despite the poor conditions being offered we appreciate what the Chinese are doing.⁹⁵

Although many Zambians still believe labor relations require improvement, they also recognize the opportunities China presents for Zambian development. It is interesting to note that in 2011, after four attempts, Michael Sata won the Zambian presidency. While many believe his election was a referendum on China, in his most recent campaign Sata toned-down his anti-Chinese platform and declared that he would take a pragmatic approach to Sino-Zambian relations. With this new campaign position, he finally won the election.⁹⁶

The Zambian case provides insight into the complexity of Chinese engagement in Africa. The statements relayed by Chinese managers confirm the externalization of developmental attitudes to Africa. For the managers, strenuous working conditions were critical to China's rapid development and continued

⁹³ Deborah Brautigam, *The Dragon's Gift*, 6.

⁹⁴ Ching Kwan Lee, "Raw Encounters," 658.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Mireille affa'a-mindzie, "Zambia's Presidential Election: a Referendum on Chinese Investment," *IPI Global Observatory*, October 4, 2011, accessed April 10, 2012, <http://www.theglobalobservatory.org/analysis/121-zambias-presidential-election-a-referendum-on-chinas-investment.html>.

prosperity. Living through this development period, they were confident they understood the necessary conditions to achieve growth and development. Judging by the labor conditions described by Michel and Beuret and reported by Human Rights Watch, the managers made little effort to heed Zambian or international labor standards. This lack of respect for regulation is also derived from the China's business culture, which places little value on occupational regulation. The conduct of NFC's managers prior to the violent protests was clearly influenced by the manager's domestic experiences. They carried with them the developmental attitudes present in Chinese society and were confident that they understood what is required of a population to spur development.

The case also highlight the role of the Chinese State. Through government deals akin to those of Japan and China decades before, the Chinese State facilitated NFC's entry into Africa. While operating in Zambia, NFC-Africa appeared to operate independently of the government. However, once public outrage over labor regulations threatened China's reputation, future business ventures and the supply of natural resources, the government appears to have taken an active role in Sino-Zambian affairs. Just as the central government has issued regulations and guidelines to improve business operations domestically, the PRC issued guidelines to improve SOE operations abroad. While it is unclear to what extent the state influenced NFC-Africa's implementation of a corporate social responsibility program, the timing of the events suggests the state played an influential role. It seems that when the conduct of Chinese nationals and enterprises threatens Chinese national interests in Africa, the Chinese State will take an active role in improving their conduct and repairing China's reputation.

Degradation, Dislocation and Complicity at the Merowe Dam

Chinese firms have become world leaders in dam construction due to domestic energy demands. The Three Gorges Dam along the Yangtze River serves as a symbol of China's developmental progress and dam construction abilities. A dream of Chinese leaders even before the creation of the PRC, it was viewed by the Chinese communist party as a means to both propel economic development and decrease China's reliance on coal-fired power plants.⁹⁷ The 17-year construction project reached completion in

⁹⁷ Jing-Hua Cao et. al, "Three Gorges Dam Project: Efforts and Challenges for the Environment, *Progress in Physical Geography* 34(6), <http://0-search.proquest.com.oasys.lib.oxy.edu/docview/817487650?accountid=12935>, Proquest, 743-745.

2006. The dam has a total capacity of 18,200 megawatts, providing the energy of ten modern nuclear reactors.⁹⁸ Throughout the construction process and since its completion, however, a multitude of problems surfaced, casting a shadow on the behemoth project.

Increased electric capacity has come at the cost of the region's ecosystem and environment. Before beginning construction of the dam in 1994, Chinese specialists performed an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) to identify possible environmental risks associated with the dam. While the assessment recognized negative environmental impacts, the Chinese specialists concluded that the impacts would largely be mitigated with the appropriate precautions.⁹⁹ This has not been the case. The specialists either failed to predict or chose not to report much of the dam's environmental damage. Where they did identify possible environmental degradation, they underestimated its severity. Erosion, water degradation, sediment load and loss of biodiversity have all been problems associated with the project.¹⁰⁰ The dam places substantial pressure on the coastal areas and threatens the agricultural productivity of the land. According to scientists from the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), about "172 million tons of sediment was trapped annually by the TGD in 2003-2008." This threatens the ecosystem and local residents, increasing the likelihood of dangerous floods. The dam also threatens the biodiversity of the ecologically rich region. Changing river flows and the structure itself have disrupted the natural habitats of many species. It is believed that the dam project, in conjunction with increasing levels of pollutants in the Yangtze, has caused the near distinction of five aquatic mammals including the rare Chinese River Dolphin.¹⁰¹ Additionally, hundreds of geological events have occurred since construction began, leading many to fear future destructive earthquakes around the Yangtze.¹⁰²

The dam poses serious challenges to residents of the affected area along with environmental challenges. The Three Gorges project has submerged 13 cities, 140 towns and 1,350 villages.¹⁰³ It is

⁹⁸ "Three Gorges Dam: A Model of the Past," *International Rivers*, February 2012, accessed March 30, 2012, <http://www.internationalrivers.org/en/node/4740>, 3.

⁹⁹ Jing-Hua Cao, "Three Gorges Dam Project...", 745.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² "Three Gorges Dam," *International Rivers*, 2.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

estimated that 1.3 million people were forcibly displaced by the project.¹⁰⁴ For residents in the Yangtze region, displacement has often been synonymous with a decrease in living standards. Many of the resettled rely on their natural environment to supply their economic means. According to the CAS study, the construction of the Three Gorges Dam has continuously reduced cropland, woodland, and grassland areas from 1977 to 2005.¹⁰⁵ Many residents once prosperous along the Yangtze now live on small plots of less arable land, which do not provide the same economic opportunities as their former living spaces.

According to International Rivers, an NGO that diligently researches and reports on the project, compensation for the displaced has been inadequate. Local residents received no compensation for their land since it is technically owned by the Chinese State. While economic compensation was offered, many residents claim it has often been inadequate to purchase a new home or move to a more prosperous region.¹⁰⁶ Xu Yuming, a researcher for the Chongqing government, stated in 2007,

Relocated people sacrificed a lot for the Three Gorges Dam and their living standards dropped. Now we are facing a challenge of how to improve their living standards. The quality of land is getting worse and worse...there are now more people than the land can sustain.¹⁰⁷

While the dam does provide needed energy to thousands of Chinese citizens, many resettled residents do not feel the dam improved their lives. Instead, the dam ended their way of life, leaving them powerless and impoverished.

In conjunction with the construction massive dam projects throughout China, the Chinese hydropower industry has become highly prosperous. Currently, about 87,000 dams are in China.¹⁰⁸ During China's transition to a market economy, it privatized the energy industry and forced firms to compete for market shares.¹⁰⁹ After this transition, Chinese hydropower enterprises began moving operations overseas in compliance with the "Going Global" policy. Developing countries see Three

¹⁰⁴ Ibid, 3.

¹⁰⁵ Jing-Hua Cao et al, 751.

¹⁰⁶ Jim Yardley, "Chinese Dam Projects Criticized for their Human Costs," *The New York Times*, November 19, 2007, accessed March 15, 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/19/world/asia/19dam.html?pagewanted=all>.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Michael Moore, "More than 40,000 Chinese dams at risk of breach," *The Telegraph*, August 26, 2011, accessed April 10, 2012, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/8723964/More-than-40000-Chinese-dams-at-risk-of-breach.html>.

¹⁰⁹ Jim Yardley, "Chinese Dam Projects Criticized."

Gorges as a symbol of China's expertise. Consequently, a high demand exists for Chinese hydroelectric projects abroad. According to *International Rivers*, as of January 2012, Chinese companies are involved in approximately 300 projects in 66 countries.¹¹⁰ Among these overseas projects was the Merowe Dam project in Sudan.

In the 1990s, the Sudanese government pursued funding from Canada, Malaysia, China, Arab and European countries for the Merowe Dam project. Most countries turned down Khartoum's request, with France's export credit agency COFACE publicly declining due to social and environmental concerns.¹¹¹ China's Eximbank, which provides finance void of social and environmental conditions, responded to the request. In 2002, the bank provided a loan of \$520 million, accounting for more than a quarter of the \$2 billion required for the project.¹¹² The project was primarily constructed by CCMD Company, a consortium of the parastatals Sinohydro and China International Water and Electric Company. Merowe, which was completed in 2008, has a generation capacity of 1250 megawatts per hour and primarily serves the cities of Khartoum, Port Sudan, and Dongola.¹¹³ The facility provides a substantial boost to Sudan's development and economic prospects by doubling the nation's power-generation capabilities.¹¹⁴

The Merowe project has been beset with controversy despite developmental benefits. Many of the problems related to Three Gorges also plague the Merowe Dam. The 174 kilometer-long facility reportedly displaced between 50,000 to 70,000 people.¹¹⁵ In 2002, the official government resettlement plans promised resettled communities new homes, land, free utilities, free fertilizer and cash

¹¹⁰ "Three Gorges Dam," *International Rivers*, 4.

¹¹¹ Peter Bosshard, "China's Environmental Footprint in Africa," *SAIIA China in Africa Policy Briefing*, April 2008, Accessed July 10, 2011, <http://www.sais-jhu.edu/academics/regional-studies/africa/pdf/BosshardWorkingPaper.pdf>, 3.

¹¹² *Ibid.*

¹¹³ "China plays unique role in promoting peace, development in north, south Sudan," *Xinhua News*, ed. Mu Xuequan, July 10, 2011, accessed April 2, 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2011-07/10/c_13975508_3.htm.

¹¹⁴ Peter Bosshard, Nicole Brewer, and Kristen McDonald, "Exporting Dams: China's Hydropower industry goes global," *Journal of Environmental Management*, 2008, 5.

¹¹⁵ Estimates on displacement differ. See Bosshard, "China's Environmental Footprint, 4, or Ali Askouri, "China's Investment in Sudan: Displacing Villages and Destroying Communities," in *African Perspectives on China in Africa*, 79.

compensation.¹¹⁶ Most of these entitlements have yet to be realized. Rather, the affected Sudanese tribes have been forcibly resettled from their fertile ancestral land, to cramped and infertile desert spaces. For many of the displaced, subsistence farming in the rich soil near the Nile had been way of life. Desert resettlement sites provided them little ability to continue this lifestyle. Village leaders at one site complained about this loss, citing a 65 percent increase in poverty in less than two years of resettlement.¹¹⁷ Many of the communities formerly located in the project area are experiencing a decrease in living standards similar to the hardships faced by residents resettled due to the Three Gorges Dam project.

Environmental degradation reminiscent of Three Gorges also plagues the area around Merowe. In preparation for construction of the dam, Leymeyer International, a German consultancy firm financed through Khartoum, performed an Environmental Impact Assessment. The assessment, which was not made public prior to construction, concluded that all negative impacts of the dam could be mitigated.¹¹⁸ This assessment allowed CCMD Company to begin construction on the Merowe project. However, following increased criticism of the project, two independent groups performed assessments.

An independent assessment by the Swiss Federal Institute of Aquatic Science and Technology determined that the Leymeyer's assessment failed to comply with international EIA standards. In their assessment, they found that the Merowe Project entailed severe risks to the ecosystem and local residents. "Fluctuating water levels and sedimentation would have serious negative impacts on aquatic ecology, water quality and public health."¹¹⁹ A UNEP assessment of the project supported these results, finding that Merowe negatively effected agricultural systems downstream, eroded the Nile riverbank, reduced groundwater recharge and blocked fish migrations.¹²⁰ Many of the independent findings were not considered during the original EIA, bringing into question Leymeyer's objectives and the independence of their assessment.

¹¹⁶ Bosshard et al, "Exporting Dams..." 6.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Bosshard, "China's Environmental Impact..." 3.

¹²⁰ "Sudan Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment," *UNEP*.

During construction, local residents repeatedly protested the Merowe project. This resulted in conflict between residents and Sudanese security forces. Ali Ashkouri, a human rights activist in Sudan, recalls protests against resettlement:

On Sept. 30th, a group of men, women, and children of Korgheli Village demonstrated against the dam around the dam site. The police ruthlessly attacked them using live bullets, tear gas and plastic rods. Three men were shot...on Dec. 1, the police again attacked the people of Korgheli village who refused to move and opted to stay in the ruins of their village house, which had been destroyed by the dam contractors. The police attacked them, dispersing them and eventually closing down the primary school and health centre to force them to move...¹²¹

Human rights abuses against local residents and nomads were a consistent element of Merowe's construction process. Often, CCMD was complicit in these abuses.

While the Chinese State and its SOE did not directly cause human rights abuses or fail to provide compensation packages, their support facilitated Khartoum's actions against its citizens. Illustrating compliance with Khartoum's abuses, the Chinese company operated in coordination with Sudanese security and armed forces.¹²² One example highlights the alliance of CCMD and the Sudanese State.

In 2005, Chinese contractors prevented nomads, including women and children, from accessing water while they constructed electrical towers for the project. The firm stated that they needed the water for concrete works and their own consumption.¹²³ After repeated confrontations with the nomads, the Chinese contractors called dam security forces to remove them. This caused the nomads to file complaints with a group called the Committee of the Affected People, who represented the interests of communities affected by the Merowe Dam.¹²⁴ The Committee sent representatives to the area, resulting in a meeting between the Committee, representatives of CCMD company and Sudanese government representatives. Increasing hostilities and highlighting Khartoum's use of violence and fear, the meeting was surrounded with "heavily armed army units."¹²⁵ This did not matter though, as the meeting quickly ended with no resolve. Dam representatives refused to consider to the nomads' demands and left the meeting along with

¹²¹ Ali Askouri, "China's Investment in Sudan...", 71.

¹²² Ibid, 72.

¹²³ "Hamdab Dam-Row over water wells between Chinese, residents," *Sudan Tribune*, November 28, 2005, accessed April 1, 2012, <http://www.sudantribune.com/HAMDAB-DAM-Row-over-water-wells,12802>.

¹²⁴ Ali Askouri, "China's Investment in Sudan...", 72.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

CCMD's representatives. Reporting on the incident, a Sudanese journalist remarked, "The whole affected area is on the verge of explosion anytime into violence...behind the current escalations is the Chinese contractors."¹²⁶

Recognizing the growing tensions in the region, international groups pressured China to act responsibly. In 2007, UN Special Rapporteur on adequate housing, Miloon Kothari, reported on the situation in Sudan. After accounting the human rights abuses affiliated with in the dam, such as the shooting of unarmed protestors and arbitrary arrests, she called upon all states invested in Merowe to ensure that the project did not lead to further violations. Kothari also called upon companies to halt activities until a proper assessment of the situation was made, and specifically requested that China ensure its companies "did not directly- or indirectly- negatively impact the human rights of the affected people."¹²⁷

Responding to international criticism, Yu Jiang, a spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated,

China attaches great importance to the local people's livelihood, takes the possible environment effect seriously and applies strict environment evaluation and standards...as for the Merowe Dam project mentioned by some groups, relevant Chinese enterprises won the bidding of the project and its completion will be conducive to local economic and social development as well as local people's livelihood.¹²⁸

Despite the call by UN Special Rapportuer Kothari, the Chinese company continued their operations under the protection of Sudanese armed forces until Merowe's completion. The PRC supported the continued work of CCMD under the auspices of mutual benefit, maintaining close relations with Khartoum.

The Merowe Dam case provides further insight into Chinese engagement in Africa. It is yet another example of the Chinese exporting their development experience to Africa. China's development has hinged on mega-provisions of energy through hydroelectric projects. Believing in the relation between dams and development and searching for locations overseas to expand operations, experienced Chinese firms such as CCMD Company apply the skills cultivated domestically to construct dams abroad.

¹²⁶ "Hamdab Dam-Row," *Sudan Tribune*.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Bosshard, "China's Environmental Footprint," 3.

In both the Three Gorges Dam and the Merowe Dam, the projects caused severe environmental degradation and a loss of livelihood for affected communities. Additionally, the development gains from the projects were not distributed equally. While increased energy benefitted the governments and those in urban areas, many of the affected peoples in both countries could not afford electricity or did not have access to the energy grid. Therefore, the proclaimed developmental gains were not realized for them, thus perpetuating inequality.

The projects also illustrate the developmental attitudes of the Chinese State and its SOEs. These Chinese actors believed that the developmental benefits of the project outweighed the costs. Dams substantially increase energy capacity. This increased capacity benefits firms, increasing their productivity and allowing them to operate for longer hours. The energy provided by the dams thus spurs economic growth. For the Chinese state and its SOEs, environmental degradation and dislocation are small costs to pay for increased economic growth. The statement by Yu Jiang highlights the CCP's focus on development gains. While they argue that energy would benefit the affected peoples at both dam sites, that does not appear to be the case in either project. In the Merowe case, the developmental lens under which Chinese actors operate influenced their perceptions of the project and its future benefits for the Sudanese people.

The Merowe case highlights the utility of China's nonintervention policy as well. Considering Sudan's wealth of oil, the Chinese government has a significant interest in maintaining strong government relations with Khartoum. Sudan accounts for about five percent of China's oil imports. The Government of China has its largest overseas oil project in the country and has built a \$700 million oil refinery. About half of China's overseas oil comes from Sudan and in 2005, during the construction of the Merowe project, China purchased half of Sudan's oil exports.¹²⁹ Maintaining positive relations with Sudan is therefore central to Chinese resource security.

Rather than remaining neutral in Sudan's domestic affairs, nonintervention allowed the Chinese government to maintain close relations with Khartoum. This changed Khartoum's calculation concerning

¹²⁹ Ali Zafar, "The Growing Relationship between China and Sub-Saharan Africa: Macroeconomic Trade, Investment, and Aid Links," *International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The World Bank*, April 20, 2007, accessed April 12, 2012.

the treatment of Sudanese citizens. Chinese support emboldened Khartoum to ignore international calls for peace and perpetuated violence against the Sudanese people. The dam itself interferes with domestic affairs, providing more power urban areas that support the Sudanese government than those in rural communities. During his congressional testimony in 2007, Eric Reeves stated,

China's commercial and capital investments in Sudan reflect no benign "alternative model" of engagement, no enlightened economic partnership, but a callous willingness to do business with the most corrupt and repressive regimes if the perceived benefits are great enough.¹³⁰

Indeed, in the case of Merowe, the policy of nonintervention helped CCMD rationalize collusion with the Sudanese government and gain lucrative profits from its construction.

The commonalities between the Merowe Dam and the Three Gorges Dam yet again depict the connection between China's domestic development and its outward engagement. The Merowe project caused similar degradation and dislocation as the Three Gorges project along the Yangtze. It also highlighted the role developmentalism plays in outward engagement, the influence of natural resources in Chinese State conduct and the efficacy of China's nonintervention policy.

7. Conclusions

Sino-African relations are influenced by China's experience as an aid recipient, the PRC's own development strategies and the state's national interests. As the case studies illustrate, Chinese operations in Africa are based on their development process and resulting developmental attitudes. The state's relations in Zambia and Sudan both depict the influence of Japanese aid modalities on Chinese foreign affairs and donor strategies. Central to these strategies are the resource-for-infrastructure agreements that Japan and China utilized in decades past. The use of Chinese firms and materials to construct these infrastructure projects also imitates prior Japanese strategies aimed at promoting business overseas and securing natural resources. Chinese assistance reflects elements of the Beijing Consensus as well. The CCP takes a market-driven approach to development assistance, advocating that Chinese engagement support export-led growth through the transmission of capital, infrastructure, skills and technology. Chinese politicians argue that African leaders should embrace the market just as China did, allowing

¹³⁰ Eric Reeves, "Testimony on China and Darfur, to the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, *SudanReeves.org*, November 28, 2007, accessed April 4, 2012, <http://www.sudanreeves.org/2007/11/28/testimony-on-china-and-darfur-to-the-subcommittee-on-national-security-and-foreign-affairs/>.

Chinese investment and trade to spur growth and diversify African economies. Chinese modalities in Africa are unequivocally derived from their own development strategies.

As the case studies show, Chinese engagement is not only an externalization of China's development strategies. Rather, it is an externalization of China's entire development experience. The occupational safety problems, difficult labor relations, environmental degradation and dislocation recounted in the Zambian and Sudanese cases highlights the connection between China's domestic problems and resulting issues in Africa. Exemplifying the developmentalism that permeates Chinese society, many Chinese actors take a "no pain, no gain" attitude towards development. They focus far more on the end goal rather than the means necessary to achieve these goals. Chinese managers in Zambia did not perceive the difficult labor conditions they imposed as labor exploitation. For them, difficult working conditions were associated with their experiences during China's rapid development. This attitude was also expressed in Sudan. While the Chinese State and SOE were aware of the environmental and human costs related to the dam, they perceived these costs as necessary evils. For them, such evils were outweighed by the benefits of improved power generation capacity. The developmental attitudes resulting from China's rapid development have altered how Chinese actors perceive and rationalize their activities domestically and in Africa.

The differing results of each case study provide insight into Chinese engagement and the role national interests play in such engagement. Critical national interests in Africa include the acquisition of natural resources, development of a positive reputation abroad, entrance of Chinese firms into African markets and the abolishment of Taiwanese-African relations. Zambia is a democratic country with an active civil society. Public outcry in the country seriously threatened China's future acquisition of resources, Zambian political support and the prospects of Chinese companies in the country. NFC, too, feared that the Chinese backlash threatened their operations. Far from improving their behavior due to a concern for the Zambian workers, Chinese actors improved their conduct when they felt their interests in Zambia were jeopardized.

The Sudanese case provides a sharp contrast to Zambia's example. Living under an authoritarian regime, the Sudanese people have little influence on the activities of their government. Whereas in

Zambia, an active civil society exists, civil society actors in Sudan are ignored or actively silenced. International criticism also failed to have a significant influence on China's foreign affairs in Sudan. While the Chinese government cares about its reputation, national resource acquisition prevailed in this case. Sudanese oil is a vital energy source for China. Hence, maintaining positive relations with Khartoum was critical for China's resource security. Altering the behavior of Chinese actors and joining in international criticism would have threatened China's relationship with Khartoum and resource security. Therefore, Chinese behavior in Sudan remained static due to the CCP's need for Sudanese oil.

In addition to highlighting the role of national interests in Chinese engagement, the case studies emphasize the priority Chinese actors place on government relations. Coming from a nation in which the State influences many aspects of society, Chinese actors prioritize government relations over relations with other interest groups. In Zambia, Chinese actors did not alter their behavior initially due to support from the Zambian government. It was only when an anti-Chinese presidential candidate gained popularity that the Chinese State and NFC-Africa changed their conduct for fear of damaged government relations. The Sudanese case shows the opposite. In Sudan, Chinese activities and behavior remained unchanged as Khartoum fully supported their operations. Throughout Africa, it is repeatedly seen that Chinese actors emphasize government relations and defer to official state positions.

Finally, this research brings into question *who* Chinese engagement supports. Within the China-Africa policy and throughout official statements, one senses that Chinese engagement will help all Africans climb out of poverty. However, in both cases, Chinese activities helped certain sectors of society more than others. Within Zambia, working-class Zambians were exploited while those affiliated with the government and those invested in the mining industry benefited. In Sudan, impoverished Sudanese nomads and villagers were displaced and disenfranchised to the benefit of those in the Sudanese government and their supporters around Khartoum. It appears that Chinese engagement does not facilitate equitable development when looking beyond the case studies as well. China's top trade partners include Nigeria, Sudan, Angola, Zambia and South Africa.¹³¹ Excluding South Africa, none of China's main

¹³¹ "China and Africa: Assessing the Relationship on the eve of the Forth Forum on China Africa Co-operation," *The Bulletin of Fridays of the Commission, African Union Commission*, 3.1 (2010): 64-65.

partners fair well on traditional measures of human development. The other four states listed above all rank low on the UNDP's Human Development Index.¹³² Despite the rhetoric, Chinese engagement has yet to fulfill the interests of many common Africans. It appears that engagement generally supports those already in positions of power. Similar to China's domestic situation, engagement has perpetuated inequality. Those at the lower-rungs of society bear the costs while those in higher-classes reap the benefits.

While the case studies depict the externalization of China's domestic problems and the influence of national interests on Chinese behavior, Chinese engagement does offer some development prospects to African countries. For economist Jeffrey Sachs, Sub-Saharan Africa suffers from a handful of poverty traps that have prevented development. He asserts that five structural reasons explain why poverty is most persistent in the region: high transport costs and small market size, low-productivity agriculture, a very high disease burden, adverse geopolitics and slow diffusion of technology.¹³³ Building upon Sach's conclusions, Paul Collier also identifies lack of integration into the world economy as a major hindrance for Africa's development.¹³⁴

Chinese engagement addresses some of these issues. The vast amounts of FDI, loans and grants provide Africa more capital to support development. On a continent that is incredibly infrastructure-deficient, China's resource-for-infrastructure loans provide African states the infrastructure necessary to promote development. The UN coordinator in Sudan has stated, "China's role in infrastructure cannot be underestimated. It is clear that building a transport grid and electricity grid is an area where Chinese expertise can make a big difference."¹³⁵ PRC development assistance through bilateral agreements, FOCAC agreements and multilateral institutions also addresses some of the gaps identified by Sachs. For instance, professional training opportunities, agricultural development centers, capacity-building measures and the provision of medical assistance all facilitate development.

¹³² "International Human Development Indicators," *United Nations Human Development Report*, United Nations Development Program, 2011, accessed March 2, 2012, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/data/map/>.

¹³³ Jeffrey Sachs et al, "Ending Africa's Poverty Trap," 130.

¹³⁴ Paul Collier, *The Bottom Billion*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 79-87.

¹³⁵ "China plays unique role in promoting peace," *Xinhua News*.

Increased trade and investment with China also integrates African companies and markets into the world economy. As Collier identified, this is extremely beneficial for African development. Most importantly, Chinese engagement in Africa is changing worldwide perceptions of the continent. Whereas in the past, the West has been quick to cast Africa as a corrupt, impoverished and conflict-stricken continent, Chinese actors recognize Africa's recent economic growth and political stability. Since much of the world is currently looking to China, it has also witnessed China's engagement in Africa and is in turn realizing the improved environment within Africa. Fearing a Chinese monopoly over African goods and markets, many states and companies are now looking to Africa in a new light and pursuing their own engagement. Chinese engagement has certainly benefitted African development by helping states integrate into the world economy, providing vital capital and infrastructure, and changing worldwide perceptions of the continent.

Despite potential benefits, it appears that African states are more likely to inherit the negative aspects of China's development process rather than rapid economic growth and widespread poverty alleviation. Chinese discourse on Sino-African relations exaggerates the development opportunities the PRC provides to African states. Many African countries are not in the position China found itself in thirty years ago. China's development has been based on the factor endowment in which it has a strong comparative advantage: labor. The sheer size of the population enabled China to become the factory of the world. While many African states are also well-endowed with cheap labor, they do not necessarily have the combination of infrastructure, technology and strong state policies to fully maximize the productivity of their labor forces. Absolutely critical to Chinese development, as noted by Justin Yifu Lin, Senior Vice President and Chief Economist of the World Bank, was the ability of the Chinese State to facilitate development through strategic policies.¹³⁶ Considering that many of China's partners in Africa struggle with good governance and political stability, the ability of African states to adopt such state-centered and well-organized macroeconomic policies is questionable.

¹³⁶ Justin Yifu Lin, "Learning From the Past to Reinvent the Future," opening remarks at the Seoul ABCDE on June 16, 2009, accessed March 3, 2012.

There is another caveat for African states following China's export-led development model. As Paul Collier recounts in his book, *the Bottom Billion*, African manufacturing industries will have to compete with the manufacturing behemoth of China within the global economy.¹³⁷ Whereas when China developed, there were few areas in the world with their manufacturing potential and cheap labor, African states will have to compete with the highly-efficient manufacturing industry in China. Compounding this problem, the current financial crisis has decreased the flow of outward investment by the developed world and decreased their ability to purchase goods from abroad. Africa's development will likely be much more challenging and slower than that experienced by China. Unfortunately, because of the differing geopolitical and economic circumstances of today's world, Africa's development will be arduous no matter the development strategy employed.

Considering the challenges and opportunities Chinese engagement affords Africa, what can be done to improve the prospects of African development? Africans cannot rely on the Chinese government to improve the conduct of Chinese actors abroad. Domestically, the central government has instituted regulations to address problems within Chinese society. Regulation, however, has come too slowly and with little enforcement. Although it was seen in the Zambian case that the CCP instituted guidelines for actors abroad, Africans cannot be satisfied with such actions. Considering that the Chinese government implemented the "Going Global" policy in 1999, or seven years prior to issuing the guidelines for actors abroad, improving the behavior of actors does not appear to be a major priority. Moreover, they issued guidelines and directives rather than imposing enforceable regulations. No official requirements exist for the CCP to control the activities of Chinese actors abroad.

The likelihood that the Chinese State will impose regulations aimed at supporting African development is even more unlikely due to national interests. This is especially the case when natural resources are involved. Although the Chinese State desires to assist the developing world, this desire is inferior to their need to fulfill development goals. National interests, which sometimes conflict with the stated goals of Sino-African cooperation, help explain the complexity and dynamism of Chinese

¹³⁷ Paul Collier, *The Bottom Billion*.

engagement. Considering China's overwhelming need for resource security, it is highly unlikely the Chinese State will earnestly regulate its actors abroad when resources are involved.

With the CCP unwilling or unable to protect Africans from the externalities of Chinese engagement, strong African leadership is critical to promoting comprehensive development. African leaders currently find themselves in a strategically powerful position due to China's need for markets and resources. As the case studies illustrate, Chinese actors place the most esteem on government relations. Hence, public leaders are best positioned to reorient Chinese engagement towards African development goals. While examples of leaders asserting themselves against Chinese actors exist, more African leaders must look beyond China's rhetoric of mutual benefit and maintain an active role in shaping Sino-African relations. Leaders should strive to gain an understanding of both the costs and benefits of China's development experience, as well as China's national interests. With such an understanding, leaders can craft policies that exploit possible benefits of Chinese engagement while mitigating possible problems.

The above conclusions present an obvious problem. In some societies, public officials may be more concerned with capturing benefits for the ruling elite rather than for comprehensive development. In this case, the role of civil society, private leaders and regional organizations is crucial. While Chinese actors are not always responsive to civil society concerns, NGOs and other groups have power in their ability to publicize the negative ramifications of Chinese activities. Particularly within developing states, the CCP is deeply concerned with maintaining a positive and responsible reputation. Negative publicity threatens this reputation and may influence Chinese actors to improve engagement. Since Chinese activities are business-oriented, African private leaders also play an influential role in pressuring Chinese firms to operate in a manner conducive to development. These leaders can influence investment choices and promote adherence to occupational and environmental standards. Finally, while criticism from the international community does not always persuade Chinese actors to alter their behavior, criticism from African organizations would likely be effective. China needs Africa to fulfill its national interests and development trajectory. Positive relations with organizations such as the African Union and NEPAD are priorities for the Chinese State. Pressure from such organizations will likely be very effective in altering

engagement. Even in states where the interests of the people are not the interests of the ruling class, means exist to improve Chinese engagement in favor of development.

When studying China's development experience, one finds that the State exploited relationships with more developed countries to fulfill its development needs and capture new opportunities. Just as China acts in its own interests, African actors must act in their own interests. As the economist Alexander Gershenkron asserted in the 1950s, developing states (referred to by Gershenkron as backwards) that develop later have the benefit of learning from the developmental processes of industrialized economies.¹³⁸ Therefore, with knowledge of China's development experience and the resulting societal problems, African leaders can learn from China's development process and construct informed strategies to leverage Chinese engagement for the best developmental outcomes.

Sino-African relations are often asymmetrical, favoring Chinese actors more so than their African counterparts. However, with cognizance of China's developmental experience, African leaders can rebalance Sino-African relations and realize the win-win outcomes discussed in the China-Africa policy. Africa is already threatened by many structural problems and cannot afford to inherit any of China's development externalities. Chinese engagement does offer African states development opportunities. If African leaders navigate this engagement and learn from China's domestic experience, then such engagement could seriously spur comprehensive African development.

¹³⁸ Fishlow, Albert, "Review of Alexander Gershenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays*," EH.Net Economic Services, February 13, 2003, <http://eh.net/node/2726>.

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