Critiquing Wittgenstein?s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: A Call for Lenses Beyond the Logical Structure

Abstract

In Ludwig Wittgenstein?s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein claims that regardless of the mode of projection, two different modes of communication, such as a picture of a cat in a hole, and the sentence, ?The cat is in the hole? can be the same, if they capture the same logical structure. In this paper I investigate the effect of applying this view to Wittgenstein?s own text. I specifically address one passage at 4.014 where Wittgenstein compares different forms of musical expression, and claims they can all capture the same logical structure. However, this passage falls outside of Wittgenstein?s account of a meaningful proposition. Therefore I conclude there must be another account of meaning, ?philosophical meaning.? In order to understand a passage which is philosophically meaningful the modern reader needs biographical information, a cultural context, philosophical background information, and knowledge of the philosophical impact the passage has had. By applying Wittgenstein?s view to his own passage it is clear that his account of meaning is too narrow.