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dc.contributor.authorSalter, Alexander W.
dc.date.accessioned2020-09-01T15:20:03Z
dc.date.available2020-09-01T15:20:03Z
dc.date.issued2010-04-20
dc.identifier.urihttps://scholar.oxy.edu/handle/20.500.12711/9077
dc.description.abstractIn this paper I test the predictions of tournament theory using panel data from international fencing competitions. The theory predicts that for a given level of prize spread, agentsÕ effort incentives are reduced due to the asymmetry. Using two measures of prize spread, I estimate the impact of these measures on performance for five separate skill-sorted cohorts using OLS and the Heckman selection model. I find evidence of ordinal disincentive effects for fencers of a lower skill level, which is consistent with the predictions of the theory.
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
dc.subjectTournament theory
dc.subjectprize spread
dc.subjecteffort
dc.subjectincentives
dc.subjectfencing
dc.titleEn Garde! Tournament Asymmetry and Disincentive Effects in International Fencing Competitions
dc.typepaper
dc.abstract.formatonep
dc.source.issueecon_student
dc.identifier.legacyhttps://scholar.oxy.edu/econ_student/1


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